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penses and to create reserves4 Revenues not required "for business purposes" must
be returned from time to time to members on a pro rata basis according to the amount
of business done with each.2s An interesting problem, not yet considered by the courts,
is whether "business purposes" includes expansion. If expansion is considered to be a
business purpose, some regulation of this matter might be desirable to prevent a ma-
jority from forcing a minority to contribute to an expansion not desired by all.
Public Utilities-Holding Company Act of 1935-Power of District Court to Ap-
prove Corporate Simplification Plan in Non-adversary Proceeding-[Federal].-A hold-
ing company registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act, submitted to
the Securities and Exchange Commission a voluntary plan for corporate simplification.
The plan provided that it was not to become effective until approved by a federal
court.2 After notice to persons affected and a hearing at which no objections were
raised, the commission entered an order approving the plan.s Thereafter, at the re-
quest of the company, the commission applied to a federal district court "to enforce
and carry out .... the plan," alleging among other things that officers and directors
of the company feared that if they carried out the plan without having obtained court
approval, creditors and security holders of the company might bring suit to subject
them to liability.4 Held, inter alia, that Section ii(e) of the act empowers the district
court to take jurisdiction of the subject matter. In re Community Power and Light Co.s
24 Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. i936) § 687(36); Ga. Laws (1937), No. 503, § 14; N.D.
Laws (1937) c. 115, § 25; N.M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, Supp. 1938) § 32-1340; Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Pardon, 1938) tit. i4, § 276; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 3291(64); Mont. Code (Supp.
1939) § 6396.20. Many municipal utilities are subject to similar legislation. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(i939) c. iui, § 1o7; Conn. Rev. Stat. (1930) § 532; Iowa Code (1939) § 6151.i; Minn.
Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 1312.
2S Ala. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1936) § 687(36); Ga. Laws (1937) No. 503, § 14, N.D.
Laws (1937) c. IIS, § 25; N.M. Stat. Ann. (Courtright, Supp. 1938) § 32-1340; Pa. Stat. Ann.
(Purdon, 1938) tit. 14, § 276; Tenn. Code Ann. (Michie, 1938) § 3291(64); Mont. Code (Supp.
1939) § 6396.20-
149 Stat. 8b3 (i935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 (Supp. 1939).
2 In the Matter of Community Power and Light Co., Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 1803, p. 3;
No. 1804, p. 7 (i939).
3 In the Matter of Community Power and Light Co., Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 1803, p. 20
(1939). For discussion of the plan used in the instant case see Feldman, Voluntary Reorgan-
ization under the Holding Company Act, A3 Corp. Reorg. 227 (294o); Recapitalization un-
der Section ii(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 49 Yale L.J. 1297 (1940).
4 SEC's Application to the Court, count 14. The alleged fear of the officers and directors of
the company that they might incur liability if they attempted to carry out the plan before court
approval appears to be inconsistent with that provision in the plan according to which it was
not to become effective until such approval had been obtained. Indeed, this allegation may
have been inserted in the petition in order to bring the application within that provision of
§ zi(e) which provides that applications are to be made in accordance with § i8(f). One of
the provisions of § i8(f) is that an action may be brought when any person is about to violate
the act or any order thereunder.
s 3 3 F. Supp. 9o (N.Y. i94o). The court also held that §§ ii(b) and ii(e) of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act are constitutional; and that the plan submitted to the court was
fair and equitable and effectuated the provisions of § xi(b).
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The instant case raises for the first time the problem of whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission may, in a non-adversary proceeding, obtain judicial approval of
voluntary plans of corporate simplification under the Holding Company Act. The
court's interpretation of the statute so as to allow the SEC to seek blanket approval of
a plan in a district court is open to serious question.
Under Section ii(e) the commission may approve plans submitted to it by a regis-
tered holding company and
the Commission, at the request of the company, may apply to a court, in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (f) of section iM, to enforce and carry out the terms .... of such plan.6
Subsection (f) of Section i8 authorizes the commission to enforce the provisions of the
act by seeking an injunction in the proper federal district court against any person
who "is engaged or about to engage in any acts .... which constitute or will constitute
a violation of the provisions of this title, or .... any .... order thereunder."7 In
addition, Section ii(e) provides:
If, upon any such application, the court, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall ap-
prove such plan as fair and equitable and as appropriate to effectuate the provisions of Sec-
tion ii, the court as a court of equity may, .... for the purpose of carrying out the terms
.... of such plan, take exclusive jurisdiction .... of the company .... and the assets
thereof .... and shall have jurisdiction to appoint a trustee. 8
It may be admitted that Section ii(e) contemplates a procedure distinct from, and
in addition to, the kind of court action provided for in Sections 24 and i8(f).1° While
Sections 18(f) and 24 provide for actions by or against particular persons, Section zx(e)
appears to confer upon the court a more general supervisory power over the entire
plan.- The application may be made to the court "to enforce and carry out .... the
plan," and, to that end, the court may appoint a trustee and exercise equitable powers.
The statute does not seem to require that the proceeding be "adversary" in the sense
649 Stat. 822 (1935), iS U.S.C.A. § 79k(e) (Supp. 1939).
7 49 Stat. 832 (1935), x5 U.S.C.A. § 79r(f) (Supp. 1939).
8 49 Stat. 822 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k(e) (Supp. 1939).
949 Stat. 834 (x935), iS U.S.C.A. § 79x(a) (Supp. 1939). This section provides: "Any
person .... aggrieved by an order issued by the Commission .... may obtain a review of
such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States .... by filing in such court,
within sixty days after the entry of such order, a written petition ..... [Then] such court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order, in whole or in part.
No objection to the order .... shall be considered by the court unless such objection shall
have been urged before the Commission ..... The findings of the Commission as to the facts,
if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive."
10It might be argued, however, that § xi(e) contemplates a procedure exactly like that
provided for in § 18(f); that the only reason for inserting § xi(e) was to set out fully all pro-
visions relating to voluntary plans, so that if the constitutionality of the provisions for volun-
tary plans were not upheld, the rest of the act would not be affected. See Electric Bond & Share
Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938), in which the registration provisions of the act were stated to
be separable from § i r.
11 It should be noted, however, that § 24 also provides for action somewhat broader than
mere action by a particular person, in that it provides for the circuit court to modify and set
aside orders. But cf. Wright v. SEC, 1i2 F.(2d) 89 (C.C.A. 2d 194o) (where statute gives
district court exclusive jurisdiction of violations, powers granted circuit court for review may
not be construed as being inconsistent therewith).
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that an action must be brought against particular persons.'2 The question remains,
however, as to when a proceeding under Section ii(e) may be brought.
One interpretation of these provisions is that district courts have no power to pass
upon the fairness of plans at the request of the commission merely because it appears
that some stockholders or security holders are not in favor of the plan.13 The applica-
tion to the district court to "enforce and carry out .... the plan" is to be made in
accordance with the provisions of Section i8(f), which deals exclusively with remedy-
ing violations or threatened violations of regulations made under the act. It may be
urged that violations or threatened violations as used in Section i8(f) does not mean
mere refusal to aid in consummating a plan, but rather means refusal to aid in the exe-
cution of a plan which has already been accepted. Moreover, the sanctions provided
in Section 1i(e) are the appointment of a trustee and the exercise of equitable powers
by the court--sanctions which, it may be argued, presuppose a necessity for remedying
difficulties encountered in enforcing a plan.4 And while the section does contain the
language that "the courts shall approve such plan as fair and equitable," that language
read in its context might be taken to mean that the power to approve the plan is to be
exercised only in connection with the court's aid in carrying out the plan. That is, that
the provision for approving the plan is inserted in Section ii(e) for the purpose of
avoiding the otherwise possible situation in which a district court would be asked to
aid in carrying out a plan which had never been approved by a court.
This interpretation of the statute is further supported by the fact that detailed pro-
visions for judicial review of commission orders are made in Section 24,6 which places
the power of review in the circuit courts of appeal. It may be contended that that pow-
er is exclusive,17 since for the district courts to pass upon plans results in circumventing
not only the detailed safeguards for the administrative process set up in Section 24,
but also those safeguards which are implicit in review by the circuit courts. Section 24
provides that "findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive," and it sets up a sixty-day time limit for review. No cor-
2 See S. Rep. 621, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1935), at 8. "This [§ ii(e)] makes it possible for
companies to submit their own readjustment plans for the .... approval of the Commission
at any time .... and to have those plans carried out if necessary in the federal courts of
equity." See also pp. 13, 32-33.
x3 The plan had been accepted by a majority of the stockholders at a stockholders' meeting.
There is no allegation in the application to the district court of any specific acts on the part of
any stockholders. The only allegation touching on "violation" is the officers' fear of suit. See
note 4 supra.
X4 The absence in § ii(e) of a provision giving the district court power to modify com-
mission orders (contrasted with the presence of such a provision in § 24) is, perhaps, an indica-
tion that the district court is to enforce rather than review.
"5 Meaning, through the reference to § i8(f), the "proper district court of the United
States." It might be urged that this reference to § i8(f) is merely a venue provision for § ii(e).
But f Congress had so intended, it could have stated in § ii(e) that actions under that section
be brought in the federal district courts.
z6 Note o supra.
17 Section 24 expressly states that the circuit court is to have exclusive jurisdiction, but the
provision is qualified by the phrase, "Upon the filing of such transcript"-meaning "transcript
of the record upon which the order complained of was entered."
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responding safeguards for the administrative process are contained in Section xi(e).
While the "substantial evidence" rule might be applied by a district court under Sec-
tion ii(e), there is no statutory provision rendering the application of that rule man-
datory.'8 And while, if the application to the district court under Section ii(e) is made
before the expiration of the sixty-day period, there is no circumvention of the sixty-day
provision, there would be a circumvention where application is made after the expira-
tion of the sixty-day period. In the latter case, of course, it might be argued that the
commission had waived the benefits of the provision. Review by a circuit court rather
than by a district court provides further protection to the administrative process in
that one less time-consuming appeal is possible; and also in that the three-judge cir-
cuit court is supposedly better qualified to pass upon the questions than is the single-
judge district court.' 9
The statute may be construed, however, as allowing the district court to pass upon
the plans at the request of the commission upon a mere allegation that some stock-
holders are not going to act in accordance with the plan. The threatened violation
which by reference to Section 18(f) is made a ground for exercise of jurisdiction may be
interpreted as including mere threatened refusal to accept the plan.20 The provisions
for the appointment of a trustee and for the exercise of equitable powers do not, it may
be urged, presuppose any actual difficulty in enforcing a plan; the emphasis should be
placed upon the power of the court to "approve the plan as fair and equitable," 2 with
the exercise of the equitable powers being available for use in the discretion of the
X8 It might be argued, however, that the district court would in any event be required to
apply the "substantial evidence" rule, and that it would be required to apply that rule as to
the evidence before the commission, without permitting the introduction of new evidence
before the court. Cf. Shields v. Utah Idaho R. Co., 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
'9 It may be urged, however, that in those instances where district court judges are not
so pressed for time, they will be able to give more careful consideration to the matter than
would a circuit court.
"0 In the instant case, the plan was not to become effective until court approval. It is diffi-
cult to conceive of a "violation" of such an order. However, it may be contended that the
SEC "order" approving the plan is distinct from the plan and became effective upon publica-
tion. 49 Stat. 833 (1935), iS U.S.C.A. § 79t(c) (Supp. 1939). Thus any present or threatened
future action to prevent the SEC from applying to the court or to enjoin the company's
officers and directors from going forward with the plan would, in a sense, be a violation of the
order. Although no objection was made at the hearing before the SEC on the plan, it is possible
that the company or the SEC felt that refusal by a minority of the stockholders to approve
the plan when submitted to a stockholders' meeting was a threatened violation; or it is possible
that either the company or the SEC had notice of the intention of dissenting stockholders to
bring an action in the Delaware chancery court to enjoin the company from further prosecuting
the plan. See note 22 infra.
2z The power of approval does not, it may be said, confer upon the district court authority
to alter or modify the plan. Section ii(e) provides that the commission may modify the plan
submitted by the company; but there is no provision that the commission's plan may be modi-
fied by the district court. judicial power to modify or alter a commission order is conferred
by § 24. This interpretation is supported by the analogous procedure under the Railroad
Reorganization Act where the plan submitted by the ICC to the court may be approved or
rejected by the latter. If the plan is rejected, it must be returned to the ICC for modification.
49 Stat. 918 (I93s), ii U.S.C.A. § 205(f) i939).
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court.?2 Moreover, it may be said that the provisions of Section 24 for review by the
circuit courts are not exclusive;13 that Section 24 is not primarily intended to provide a
means for judicial approval of a plan, but is rather intended to provide redress for ag-
grieved parties for all sorts of commission orders, of which the order approving a plan
is but one.2 4 Since the language of the statute is in no sense conclusive the importance
of the policy considerations attendant upon acceptance of either interpretation renders
clarifying legislation desirable.2s
The procedure followed in the instant case does undoubtedly facilitate the accom-
plishment of the purposes of the act. Through this procedure the amount of adminis-
trative detail is reduced in that there is no possibility of the company's having carried
on voluminous correspondence with stockholders,26 or the SEC's having approved the
filing and registration of papers, only to find that the plan does not merit court ap-
proval; and also in that the early obtaining of judicial approval eliminates the need for
defending the numerous security-holder suits which might otherwise be brought. This
argument is of no force, of course, unless the decree of the district court is binding upon
security holders in respect to the issues litigated.27 There are two grounds upon which
it may be argued that the decree is binding. It may be said that the proceeding is one
"in rem," and that the court's jurisdiction over the "company" gives it jurisdiction
over the "res" so as to bind all who are interested therein. Thus the proceeding is
analogous to that under the Railroad Reorganization Act.2 It should be noted, how-
The discretionary exercise of these powers is perhaps illustrated by the instant case.
After the application to the court in the instant case, a stockholder brought suit in a Delaware
chancery court to enjoin the company from enforcing the plan. The court's appointment of a
trustee may perhaps be explained by this fact.
23 See note 17 supra.
24 See Warner, An Approach to the Extent of Judicial Supervision over Administrative
Agencies, 28 Georgetown L. J. 1o42 (194o); 48 Yale L. J. 1257 (1939); 38 Mich. L. Rev. 682
(1940).
2S Attempting to secure a revision of the legislation might, of course, be thought to be po-
litically inexpedient, because it would serve as an opportunity for emasculating the entire
section.
26 Considerable paper work was involved, of course, in obtaining stockholder approval of
the plan prior to the application to the court in the instant case: notice of hearing before the
commission; notice and summaries of the plan issued by the corporation and the commission;
and solicitation of proxies by the company in accordance with § ii(g). (49 Stat. 823 (1935),
15 U.S.C.A. § 79k(g) (Supp. x939)). It does not appear that § ii actually requires the stock-
holder approval used in the plan in the instant case. Although § 26 of the Delaware Corpora-
tion Law (Del. Rev. Code (1935) § 2058) requires assent by a majority of each class of stock-
holders to an amendment of the certificate of incorporation, it may be argued that that law is
inapplicable to a proceeding under a federal statute. It was argued in the instant case that,
under the doctrine of Keller v. Wilson & Co., i9o AUt. ir5 (Del. 1936), stockholder approval
could not operate to eliminate the accumulated preferred dividends, but the court held that
the state statute was not applicable. It may be supposed, however, that the stockholder ap-
proval in the instant case was an added inducement to the court's approving the plan.
27 In the commission's view, upon approval of the plan by the security holders and the
court, dissenters would be bound to accept the securities provided by the plan and would have
no further remedy. Hold. Co. Act Rel. No. 18o4, p. 7 (1939).
2849 Stat. 911 (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. § 205 (x939).
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ever, that even if it be said that the proceeding is one which could be made in rem by
Congress, the statute does not, as does the Railroad Reorganization Act, specifically
provide that security holders are to be bound.29 In the second place, it may be argued
that Section i8(f), in accordance with which the proceeding.under Section i1(e) is
brought, provides for a class suit, wherein one or more of the security holders represents
at least all those holding the same class of securities so as to bind them by the decree.
However, the proceeding in the instant case was not set up as a class suit; in fact there
were no security holders before the court.30
The advantage to be gained by obtaining a binding decree in the district court de-
pends to some extent, of course, upon the effect to be given to Section 24, providing for
application for review to a circuit court within sixty days by "parties aggrieved." If
Section 24 is construed as cutting off all possibility of objection to a plan after sixty
days from the effective date of the plan, then there is little advantage to be gained by
obtaining a binding decree in the district court. If, however, the running of the sixty-
day period does not prevent a person's raising the issue of the fairness of the plan at
any time an action to enjoin a violation is brought against him, there is a great advan-
tage in obtaining a binding decree at an early stage.
Another advantage of the procedure followed in the instant case is that it enables the
commission to choose, within limits, the court in which the proceedings shall be
brought.3z Furthermore, the interpretation given Section ir(e) in the instant case,
29 The Railroad Reorganization Act provides that, when a plan is submitted to the court by
the ICC and is confirmed by the court, the decree is binding, subject to the right of review,
upon the debtor, its stockholders, and creditors. 49 Stat. 920 (1935), 11 U.S.C.A. § 2o5(f)
(1939). It might be argued that, whether security holders are "bound" or not, they cannot
appeal, since they were not parties to the record.
In any event, it would appear reasonable to predicate the right of objecting stockholders or
creditors to obtain review from the district court upon timely entry of objections in that court,
as was done in proceedings under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act. (48 Stat. 912 (1934), Ixr
U.S.C.A. § 207 (x937)). In re Milwaukee & Sawyer Bldg. Corp., 79 F. (2d) 478 (C.C.A. 7th
1935). If, however, the present proceeding is considered ex parte, the proper remedy might be
to apply to the court to have its order set aside, and, if the application is denied, to have the
order of denial reviewed on appeal. See In re Snyder, 4 F.(2d) 627 (C.C.A. 9th 1925).
30 One consideration indicating that the decree is not fully binding on security holders is
that § 24 provides for a sixty-day period during which "parties aggrieved" may apply to the
circuit court for review. It may be argued that a proceeding in the district court, before the
expiration of the sixty-day period, does not cut off that possibility of review. The importance
of this consideration depends to some extent upon whether the security holders may appeal to
the circuit court from the decree of the district court. If they can appeal, the effect to be given
§ 24 makes little difference, except that the circuit court might feel constrained to give greater
weight to a district court decree, on appeal, than to an SEC determination, on review. But
it may be that, because they are not parties to the record, security holders cannot appeal from
a district court decree. Substantially the same question, still undecided, arises under the Rail-
road Reorganization Act. By the terms of that Act, the ICC must submit the plan to the dis-
trict court before the plan becomes effective. Whether the determination by the district
courts cuts off the review of ICC orders by a three-judge court at the instance of a party
aggrieved, as provided for in the Judicial Code (38 Stat. 220 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 47 (1927)),
has not been decided. See io Remington, Bankruptcy § 4326 (I939).
3z Neirbo v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939) (action involving company
may be brought in state in which company is doing business as well as in state of incorpora-
tion), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 397 (1940).
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thkt ther are no standards for determining when proceedings shall be brought under
the act, leaves the commission free either to bring or not to bring proceedings, as the
circumstances of the particular case seem to dictate. Moreover, allowing officers and
directors to secure a judicial umbrella for their actions early in the proceedings will
probably result in having more voluntary plans filed. In the instant case, the strategy
of inserting in the plan the provision making its operation contingent upon judicial
approval perhaps made the arguments in favor of obtaining district court approval
even more persuasive to officers and directors. This provision gave them assurance that
in the administration of the plan there would be no pressure on them to take any action
except under court approval.32
On the other hand, it would seem that the procedure followed in the instant case is
undesirable in that it tends to cause the commission to shift the responsibility for the
fairness of plans to the district courts, thereby reducing the independence of the com-
mission. Furthermore, it may be questioned whether it is desirable to permit the
streamlining of the administrative process to be carried so far as to require judicial ac-
tion in a situation which has so few of the attributes of an adversary proceeding as does
the proceeding in the present case. While the instant case may perhaps not be said to
run afoul of the constitutional "case or controversy" provision,33 it may nevertheless
be urged that the protection afforded persons by judicial action should not be dissipat-
ed in a proceeding in which the contentions of those persons are not litigated.34
32 It should be noted that there is no actual requirement under the act that either officers or
directors comply with the plan until it has been approved by a court. Even wilful violation of
commission rules or orders made under § ii may be made without incurring liability. The de-
pendence upon the courts for the enforceability of SEC orders under the Holding Company
Act is a typical administrative procedure found in other acts: Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat.
86 (i933), 15 U.S.C.A. § 77(t)(b) (Supp. ig39); Securities Exchange Act of x934,48 Stat. 9oo
(1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78(u)(c) (Supp. 1939); National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 454
(1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § i6o (e) (Supp. 1939).
33 U.S. Const., art. 3, § 2. It may be argued that in the instant case the company's security
holders are "possible adversaries" in the same sense that the United States is a possible adver-
sary in a petition for naturalization (see Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926)),
or that creditors or stockholders are possible objectors in a corporate reorganization. In each
instance, the status of the "adversary party" in relation to the "res" (citizenship, the debtor,
or the recapitalized company) is finally determined by the judgment of the court.
34 Objections to the plan may not be fully realized by security holders until it has been in
effect for some time. It is true that § 24 limits the time in which actions may be brought for
review to sixty days. It does not appear, however, whether the running of the sixty-day period
is to cut off all possibility of a security holder's raising the issue as to the fairness of the plan.
It may be argued that he could raise it in a district court in an action brought by the SEC to
remedy a violation. If the decree in the instant case is binding on all, it cuts off that possibility.
Moreover, it does not appear when the sixty-day period in the instant case started to run.
If it started to run at the time the commission approved the plan, then the instant case, in
that it was brought more than sixty days after SEC approval, does not cut off the sixty-day
0period. If, however, the period did not begin to run until after the decree of the court making
the plan effective, the decree of the court, if considered res judicata by the circuit court as to
the fairness of the plan, does operate to cut off the sixty-day period. On the other hand, it may
be argued that, in the instant case, there was adequate protection to persons affected by the
plan in that notice was given to them (i) in the hearings on the plan before the commission, (2)
by the company's solicitation of stockholder approval of the plan after it had been approved by
the commission, and (3) in the proceedings before the court.
